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BREAKING BUCKS:
SEC REGULATION BY OBFUSCATION
William A. Birdthistle*
This Article argues that the Securities and Exchange Commission’s
first and most significant response to the economic crisis profoundly
contradicts widely accepted theoretical and regulatory approaches to
financial oversight. More alarmingly, the SEC’s newest rules increase
rather than decrease the likelihood of future failures in money market
funds and the broader capital markets.
Scholars – of both neoclassical and behavioral economic theory –
have long insisted that transparency and disclosure play essential roles
in ensuring efficient capital markets and sound financial regulation.
Professors Gilson and Kraakman notably argued that the efficient
capital market hypothesis, and its reliance on a market for information,
“is now the context in which serious discussion of the regulation of
financial markets takes place.” The SEC itself subscribes – at least
publicly – to a corresponding regulatory framework: its mission
statement declares that “[o]nly through the steady flow of timely,
comprehensive, and accurate information can people make sound
investment decisions.”
Yet in newly promulgated regulations addressing the “breaking of
the buck” in the $3-trillion money market – an unstudied debacle at the
fulcrum of the 2008 financial meltdown – the SEC endorses practices
that obfuscate rather than illuminate the capital markets, including fixed
pricing for money market funds and the continued use of discredited
ratings agencies. These policies, premised implicitly upon doubt in the
ability of markets to process information effectively, obscure true perils
of money market funds. Rather than swaddling investment risks in these
misleading, self-sabotaging regulatory buffers, the SEC should
emphasize the menace of these funds. This Article offers transparent
solutions to alleviate moral hazard and systemic risk in the broader
market and to end the regulatory subsidy of these specific investments.
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The purpose of a money market fund is to provide
safety of principal, liquidity, and a reasonable rate of
return – all while boring investors into a sound sleep.
- Bruce R. Bent, chairman, The Reserve1
They [The Reserve] didn’t just break the buck, they
shattered it.
- Don Phillips, managing director, Morningstar2

INTRODUCTION
Sheer terror in horror films grabs hold not when imminent
victims frolic in sinister cornfields or other obviously creepy locales –
rather it clutches tightest when protagonists retreat to the safest of
stuffed-animal-strewn havens and yet are ambushed there by lurking
evil. The appalling gravity of the financial crisis similarly grew most
alarming not with the failure of exotic derivatives but with the
malfunction of the most mundane and reliable financial instruments:
money market mutual funds, the home of more than three trillion
dollars of America’s most conservative investments.3
Subprime mortgage unpleasantness metastasized into systemic
calamity on September 16, 2008,4 when one of oldest, most
1
Floyd Norris, Pride Goeth Before a Fall, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 16, 2008
(noting “What is most amazing is the way bragging goes before a fall,” and quoting
Bent’s aphorism from two letters Bent sent to Reserve shareholders directly before
the breaking of the buck in the Reserve’s Primary Fund.).
2
Sam Mamudi & Jonathan Burton, Money Market Breaks the Buck, Freezes
Redemptions, MARKETWATCH, Sept. 17, 2008 (“The size and speed of the
withdrawals was stunning. At 3 p.m. on Tuesday, Primary Fund’s assets stood at
$23 billion, a $40 billion hit from the $62.6 billion in the fund on Friday.”),
available at http://www.marketwatch.com/story/money-market-fund-breaks-thebuck-freezes-redemptions.
3
See INV. CO. INST., 2009 Investment Company Fact Book 146 (49th ed.
2009) (listing total net assets of all U.S. money market funds as $3,832,244,000,000
as of 2008) [hereinafter ICI FACT BOOK].
4
See HENRY M. PAULSON, JR., ON THE BRINK 234 – 237 (2010) (“I [thenTreasury Secretary Hank Paulson] feared the start of a run on the $3.5 trillion
industry.”).
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venerable, and largest money market funds – the Reserve Primary
Fund5 – broke the buck.6 For only the second time in history,7 a
money market fund failed to return one hundred cents on the dollar to
its investors. To the many who considered these funds as safe as
bank savings accounts, this startling breach of faith triggered dramatic
exit, prompting a run of hundreds of billions of dollars not just on the
Primary Fund but across the entire money market industry.8
Dysfunction in money market funds cascaded into credit markets, as
funds liquidated their holdings and deprived corporations of lenders
willing to extend vital credit for day-to-day business operations.9
Within days, the Treasury Department and the Federal Reserve
intervened to forestall meltdowns of the fund industry, the credit
markets, and the broader capital markets by announcing that the
United States of America would temporarily guarantee all 800 money
market funds against losses of up to $50 billion per fund.10 One year
later, on September 18, 2009,11 the government terminated this
guarantee. In its place, the Securities and Exchange Commission has

5

See Press Release, The Reserve, Sept. 16, 2008 (“[T]he NAV of the
Primary Fund, effective as of 4:00PM, is $0.97 per share.”), available at
http://www.reservefunds.com/pdfs/Press%Release%202008_0916.pdf.
6
See Diya Gullapalli, Money Fund, Hurt by Debt Tied to Lehman, Breaks
the Buck, WALL ST. J., Sept. 17, 2008, at C1 (noting that the “huge money market
fund, Reserve Primary Fund,” has broken the buck, “marking the first time a
conservative money-market fund has lost money in 14 years.”).
7
In 1994, the Community Bankers U.S. Government Fund – an institutional,
not retail fund – became the first money market fund to break the buck, returning 96
cents per share. See John Waggoner, Billions Stream into Ultrasafe Government
Funds, USA TODAY, Aug. 22, 2007, at 9A (opining that the fund was “tiny” and
that “Most analysts suggest that worries about money funds . . . are unfounded.”)
8
See LAWRENCE G. MCDONALD, A COLOSSAL FAILURE OF COMMON SENSE:
THE INSIDE STORY OF THE COLLAPSE OF LEHMAN BROTHERS 325 (2009) (noting the
demise of Lehman Brothers and resulting decisions that “would obliterate the
world’s economy.”).
9
See generally MATTHEW P. FINK, THE RISE OF MUTUAL FUNDS: AN
INSIDER’S VIEW (2008); MARCIA STIGUM, ANTHONY CRESCENZI, ET AL., STIGUM’S
MONEY MARKET 1110 - 1115 (2007).
10
See Press Release, U.S. Department of the Treasury, Treasury Announces
Guaranty Program for Money Market Funds, Sept. 19, 2008 (announcing the
authorization of “the assets of the Exchange Stabilization Fund for up to $50 billion
to
guarantee”
each
money
market
fund),
available
at
http://www.ustreas.gov/press/releases/hp1147.htm.
11
See Press Release, U.S. Department of the Treasury, Treasury Announces
Expiration of Guarantee Program for Money Market Funds, Sept. 18, 2009,
available at http://www.ustreas.gov/press/releases/tg293.htm.
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just promulgated a new set of rules12 intended to “strengthen the
resiliency of money market funds.”13
Until now, the placid calm of money market funds – and their
quiet but critical role in the U.S. economy – has left this topic
remarkably unstudied by financial or legal scholars.14 But, for several
reasons, the SEC’s regulatory response to the crisis is deeply
troubling and warrants much closer scholarly attention. First, the
SEC’s approach embodies a conception of financial regulation almost
entirely at odds with leading economic and legal theory. Rather than
remain agnostic as to the merit of specific investments (as
neoclassical economic theory would require15) or privilege the choice
of socially optimal investments (as behavioral theory would
encourage16), the SEC appears instead to have picked the money
market fund – an increasingly problematic and vulnerable investment
– as a specific winner in this competition. Second, the SEC’s new

12
See Money Market Fund Reform, Investment Company Act Release No.
29,132 (Feb. 23, 2010) [hereinafter Final Rule].
13
Speech by SEC Chairman Mary Schapiro, Statement on Money Market
Funds Before the Open Commission Meeting, Jan. 27, 2010, available at
http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/2010.htm.
14
In the JLR database of Westlaw, only 27 pieces contain the phrase “money
market fund” in their title; on SSRN, only 10 documents contain that phrase in their
title, abstract, or keywords. Yet outside of academic scholarship, the SEC’s new
rules, the Investment Company Act’s major study, the President’s Working Group
on Financial Markets and the G-30’s new report all demonstrate that experts in this
field are seriously concerned about the growing challenges and issues associated
with money market funds. Final Rule, supra note __; Proposing Release, supra
note __; INVESTMENT COMPANY INSTITUTE, REPORT OF THE MONEY MARKET
WORKING GROUP, at 62 (Mar. 17, 2009) [hereinafter ICI REPORT]; PRESIDENT’S
WORKING GROUP ON FINANCIAL REFORM, White Paper: Financial Regulatory
Reform – A new Foundation: Building Financial Supervision and Regulation (June
16, 2009); GROUP OF THIRTY, FINANCIAL REFORM: A FRAMEWORK FOR FINANCIAL
STABILITY (Jan. 15, 2009).
15
See generally RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW (7th ed.
2007); FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE
OF CORPORATE LAW (1998); Ronald J. Gilson & Reinier H. Kraakman, The
Mechanisms of Market Efficiency, 70 VA. L. REV. 549 (1984).
16
See generally Christine Jolls & Cass R. Sunstein, Debiasing Through Law,
J. LEG. STUD. 35 (2006); Dan M. Kahan & Donald Braman, Cultural Cognition and
Public Policy, 24 YALE L. & POL. REV. 149 (2006); David Hirshleifer, The Blind
Leading the Blind: Social Influence, Fads, and Information Cascades, in THE NEW
ECONOMICS OF HUMAN BEHAVIOR (Mariano Tonmasi & Kathryn Ierulli eds., 1995);
Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Introduction, in JUDGMENT UNDER
UNCERTAINTY: HEURISTICS AND BIASES (Daniel Kahneman, Paul Slovic, and Amos
Tversky eds., 1982).
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rules fundamentally misapprehend the operational dynamics of
money market funds, credit markets, and the sensitive interaction of
the two. By accelerating the required maturity of portfolio holdings
in money market funds and mandating the industry’s continued
reliance upon ratings agencies whose abysmal performance has been
widely condemned, the rules increase rather than decrease the
likelihood of future runs on money market funds and consequential
failures of the credit markets. Third, even though the rescue of recent
failures of these instruments required pledges of billions of dollars of
public money, the SEC has failed to adopt any insurance facility –
public or private – to underwrite future problems in this field.17 As a
response to the failure of money market funds, the SEC’s action is
inadequate and counterproductive; as a harbinger of the agency’s
oversight of future economic crises, it approaches regulatory
malpractice.
To appreciate the ramifications of the SEC’s actions, one must
begin with an understanding of the operations of money market funds.
Internally, and at their most fundamental, money market funds are
simply a species of investment fund or collective investment
vehicle.18 While hedge funds, private equity funds, venture capital
funds, and certain mutual funds regularly invest in high-risk, highreward securities for their portfolios, money market funds are
characterized by their relative conservatism. Indeed, the managers of
these funds specifically promote them as low-risk, low reward
financial havens – cash equivalents even – and often invest in only
the safest and most highly rated securities issued by the government
and large corporations. Nevertheless, as the collapse of the Primary
Fund demonstrated so palpably, money market funds are far from
risk-free nor are they insured against loss.19 Indeed, because of the
government’s recent bailout, the absence of salutary changes to these
funds is likely to increase moral hazard and future failure in this
investing arena.

17

See Final Rule, supra note __.
See Money Market Fund Reform, Investment Company Act Release No.
28,807 at 4-23 (proposed June 30, 2009) [74 FR 32688 (July 8, 2009)] [hereinafter
Proposing Release]; JOSEPH NOCERA, A PIECE OF THE ACTION: HOW THE MIDDLE
CLASS JOINED THE MONEY CLASS (1994).
19
See Proposing Release, supra note __ at 4-7.
18
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When regulating a potentially dangerous investment, financial
authorities regularly adopt neoclassical, behavioral, or prudential
responses: that is, they (a) offer neither encouragement nor
discouragement of the particular investment but require issuers to
disclose clearly the dangers to the investing public, thus allowing
market mechanisms to reward or punish the investment20; (b) promote
to investors alternative, ideally more socially beneficial, investments
while permitting sophisticated investors with full information to
select the riskier investment if they so choose21; or (c) require the
issuer to modify the investment to eliminate its dangers. In the
United States, the first, neoclassical approach is the model most
closely associated with our securities laws and regulations.
Increasingly, though, legislators have adopted the second, behavioral
approach. The third, merit-based or prudential model is rare in the
United States but employed in foreign jurisdictions with greater
command and control of their capital markets.
Unusual everywhere is the approach the SEC has adopted in
the case of money market funds, in which it has abetted the
promotion of a potentially dangerous investment by permitting its
sponsors to downplay rather than to emphasize risks without
requiring a substantive amelioration of those dangers. Such an
approach is akin to government officials, when confronted with a
deep crevasse in a sidewalk, choosing not to erect warning signs nor
to direct traffic away from peril nor to fill in the hole, but instead to
cover the hazard with a thin cloth and thereby to construct a
camouflaged snare.
Rather than draw attention to the perils of money market
funds, the SEC has aided the industry’s attempt to create an
appearance that these investments are as safe as bank deposits while
as lucrative as mutual funds. The chief way in which advisors
achieve this verisimilitude is through the use of a pricing system –
used by no other kind of investment fund – that closely resembles that
of bank accounts.22 The price of a typical mutual fund, known as its
net asset value (NAV), is a function of the value of its portfolio
20

See, e.g., POSNER, supra note __.
See, e.g., Jolls & Sunstein, supra note __.
22
See Proposing Release, supra note __, at 4-23.
21
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securities. As the value of underlying investments held by a fund
continually change, the fund’s NAV will typically fluctuate also.23
When money market funds first became available in the early 1970s,
they too featured this “floating NAV.” In the late 1970s, however,
financial advisors who managed these funds persuaded the SEC to
permit the use of a fixed NAV.24 By employing a method for
calculating NAV that does not rely upon the daily value of portfolio
securities (mark-to-market accounting) but instead permits the use of
values that assume portfolio securities will be held to maturity and
then fully paid (amortized cost accounting), money market funds can
maintain a remarkably stable NAV of $1.00 per share.25 When this
pricing scheme is combined with check-writing privileges, money
market funds look and feel a great deal like bank savings accounts.
Through another infelicitous and anti-competitive side-effect
of regulation in this arena, bank savings accounts in the late 1970s
and early 1980s were forbidden by regulation from offering an
interest rate of greater than five and one quarter percent.26 Money
market funds could and did offer much higher returns, while
projecting this appearance of as much security as bank accounts, and
thereby attracted massive inflows from investors. Were these funds
required to use the same pricing system as every other mutual fund or
to contribute the same deposit insurance premiums as bank accounts,
they would either look a great deal less like those bank accounts or
generate far lower yields. In essence, without a compelling regulatory
or theoretical justification, the SEC is providing this particular
species of investment with a regulatory subsidy that enables these
funds to win market share from bank accounts and short-term mutual
funds by generating higher rewards than the former while appearing
to have less risk than the latter.
In addition to the effect that this obfuscation has upon
investors within money market funds, the SEC’s newest regulations

23

See generally William A. Birdthistle, Compensating Power: An Analysis
of Rents and Rewards in the Mutual Fund Industry, 80 TUL. L. REV. 1401 (2006).
24
See Viktoria Baklanova, Money Market Funds: An Introduction to the
Literature (Jan. 2010), available at http://www.ssrn.com/abstract=1542983.
25
See Proposing Release, supra note __, at 4-11.
26
See Part I.B.2, The Rise & Demise of Regulation Q, infra, text
accompanying notes __.
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may also have deleterious effects on credit and capital markets
outside of these funds. The new rules are likely to exacerbate the
same forces that previously conspired in the breaking of the buck in
money market funds. Because the SEC has declined to mitigate the
risk in these funds by returning to a floating NAV or deposit
insurance, the agency has had to look elsewhere for “risk-limiting
conditions” to ensure the safety of the fund’s investments.27 The SEC
has chosen instead to require money market funds to invest only or
predominantly in securities with maturities of very short duration, on
the theory that shorter-term investments are generally less risky than
longer-term ones. Simultaneously, the SEC has reiterated its
requirement that funds invest only in securities awarded high ratings
from four credit rating agencies, on the theory that such a system will
eliminate the least risky investments.28 Both of these suppositions are
ill-founded and have been rebutted by scholarly studies. On the
question of investment maturity, Professor Jeffrey Gordon argues
persuasively that shorter maturations will only accelerate future
defaults in the event of market stresses.29 If borrowers have several
weeks to repay loans, the market will have more time to react but if,
instead, borrowers must repay or default within only a few days, a
cascade of defaults will come in a quicker flurry with less time for
rational reflection and intervention. On the question of ratings
agencies, Professor Frank Partnoy has extensively catalogued the
problems of systems that rely on misleading credit ratings, which
have been shown to enhance a false sense of security rather than to
convey accurate information.30 These rules are thus likely to make
future effects of money market funds on capital markets worse, not
better.
An obvious alternative prophylaxis in this system would be
the establishment of a public or private insurance pool to guarantee
the holdings in money market funds. As FDIC insurance has
demonstrated well, insurance can be an excellent mechanism for

27

See Final Rule, supra note __, at 3-15.
See id.
Jeffrey N. Gordon, Comment Letter to SEC re: Money Market Fund
Reform, Sept. 9, 2009, available at http://www.sec.gov [hereinafter Gordon Letter].
30
Frank Partnoy, The Siskel and Ebert of Financial Markets?: Two Thumbs
Down for the Credit Rating Agencies, 77 WASH. U. L.Q. 619 (1999).
28
29
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circumventing bank runs.31 All insurance costs money, however, and
any premiums paid to support future money market funds that
threaten to break the buck would almost certainly be drawn from
assets in those funds, thereby reducing their yield and net investment
returns. Sponsors of money market funds have previously resisted
such an approach and their position, while perhaps lacking in civicmindedness, was certainly shrewd. When these funds desperately
needed insurance recently, the federal government provided it free of
charge, thus rewarding the sponsors’ apathy.32 Unless concrete
changes are adopted now, fund sponsors may reasonably believe that
implicit governmental insurance will support funds in future also.
The market may thus suffer from the moral hazard of fund sponsors
who aggressively pursue higher returns without internalizing the costs
of such risks.33 Again, the SEC has declined to adopt a position that
might favor investors or the markets over the industry by requiring
some form of insurance in these funds.
In Part I of this Article, I discuss the economic and legal
development of money market funds in the United States, the specific
financial dynamics that precipitated the breaking of the buck in the
Reserve Primary Fund, and the broader ramifications of that failure
upon credit and capital markets in the United States.
In Part II, I analyze the new rules and rationales adopted by
the SEC in the wake of the financial crisis, particularly those
amending maturity and liquidity requirements, endorsing the
continued use of credit rating agencies, and retaining the use of a
fixed NAV in money market funds. Specifically, I examine the
degree to which these rules will – or will not – effectively address the
recent problems in this area and protect against future dysfunction in
money market funds.
In Part III, I propose and critique an array of possible solutions
informed by economic and legal theoretical frameworks to address

31

See generally Christian A. Johnson, Justice and the Administrative State:
The FDIC and the Superior Bank Failure, 36 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 483 (2005).
32
See Press Release, U.S. Treasury, supra note __ (announcing the guaranty
of money market funds by the U.S. Treasury and the Federal Reserve).
33
See generally Karl S. Okamoto, After the Bailout: Regulating Systemic
Moral Hazard, 57 UCLA L. REV. 183 (2009).
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specific issues within money market funds as well as their broader
economic impact, including the imposition of a floating NAV, the use
of a dual-tier investment structure for retail and institutional
investors, and the establishment of some system of obligatory public,
mutual, or private deposit insurance.
I. THE GROWTH & REGULATION OF MONEY MARKET FUNDS
In four short decades, the assets managed by money market
funds in the United States have soared from nothing to more than
three trillion dollars.34 Today nearly forty cents of every dollar that
Americans invest in mutual funds flow into a money market fund.35
The story of this astonishing success turns on two critical
developments involving regulatory interventions: one that limited the
investment returns of the greatest competitor of money market funds:
bank savings accounts; another that liberated money market funds to
emulate the appearance of those bank savings accounts.36 As soon as
investors believed that they could receive higher performance without
sacrificing safety, they redirected huge amounts of their savings away
from bank accounts and into money market funds.37 But when the
financial crisis exposed the structural vulnerabilities of money market
funds in 2008 and reminded the market that these funds are far riskier
than bank accounts, investors immediately redeemed hundreds of
billions of dollars.38 Thus the remarkable success – and recent
suspicion – of money market funds has long been closely entwined
with their regulatory and economic structure.39
A. Mutual Funds & Floating NAVs
Less than forty years ago, in 1971, a privately held investment
advisory company named The Reserve brought to market a new

34

See ICI FACT BOOK at 146.
See id. at 30.
36
See generally Daniel E. Levin, Breaking the Buck: The End for Money
Market Mutual Funds as We Know Them, 28 REV. BANKING & FIN. L. 747 (2009).
37
See TAMAR FRANKEL & CLIFFORD KIRSCH, INVESTMENT MANAGEMENT
REGULATION 463 (3d ed. 2005).
38
See Diana B. Henriques, The Buck Broke; So How To Retool Money
Funds?, N.Y.Times, Oct. 11, 2009, at 13.
39
For an excellent overview of the financial literature studying the economic
dynamics and performance of money market funds over the past four decades, see
Baklanova, supra note __.
35
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mutual fund called the Primary Fund.40 The investment strategy of
this novel investment – the nation’s first money market fund –
concentrated on the extremely conservative end of the investing
spectrum: the fund invested only in securities offered by the United
States government or the largest and safest corporate issuers, and only
in those securities that offered very short-term maturities. For
investors who wished to avoid perils of equity investments and
longer-term debt offerings or the unpredictability of a volatile stock
market, a fund such as this could serve as a relatively safe haven
while still providing positive, albeit modest returns. This simple idea
would win almost universal appeal amongst both retail and
institutional investors, as soon as money market funds could modify
their pricing mechanism.41
As do all mutual funds and indeed most collective investment
vehicles, a money market fund gathers assets by persuading investors
to invest cash in the fund through the purchase of shares in fund. The
fund’s investment advisor then uses this collective pool of cash to
assemble an investment portfolio by purchasing securities offered by
other companies or governments. To the extent the advisor makes
wise investment decisions, the fund’s portfolio will grow in value and
thus generate a beneficial return for all the fund’s shareholders.42
Although an investor could, of course, bypass the services of a fund
and its advisor by directly acquiring a similar portfolio of underlying
securities, millions of American individuals and institutions choose to
pay funds – or, more precisely, those funds’ advisors – billions of
dollars each year43 to serve as intermediaries to manage twelve
trillion dollars in mutual fund holdings.44 In return, these investors

40

See Revisions to Rules Regulating Money Market Funds, Securities Act
Release No. 33-6870, 55 Fed. Reg. 30239 (1990).
41
See Timothy Q. Cook & Jeremy G. Duffield, Money Market Mutual Funds
and Other Short-Term Investment Pools, in INSTRUMENTS OF THE MONEY MARKET
156, 164-165 (Timothy Q. Cook & Robert K. Laroche eds., 7th ed. 1993).
42
Note that any growth in assets under management that accrue merely as a
function of new investors joining a fund does not increase returns to existing
shareholders. Indeed, this phenomenon generally benefits only the fund sponsor.
See Birdthistle, supra note __.
43
See Baklanova, supra note __, at 5, n.6 (discussing the array and
magnitude of fees associated with the management and operation of money market
funds.
44
See ICI FACT BOOK, supra note __ (reporting total mutual fund assets
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gain access to the advisors’ investment expertise, instant financial
diversification, and the ready ability to redeem their investments for
cash.45
1. Mark-to-Market Accounting
The Investment Company Act of 194046 and rules
promulgated thereunder by the SEC47 govern the general operation of
money market funds and, indeed, all registered investment companies
(as mutual funds are statutorily defined).48 This body of law provides
specific guidance on the accounting method that advisors must use for
calculating the price that every shareholder pays for his or her shares
in a mutual fund, known as the fund’s net asset value (NAV). The
standard accounting system for mutual funds – set forth in Section
2(a)(41) of the Company Act49 in conjunction with rules 2a-450 and
22c-151 – is known as “mark-to-market accounting.”52 Mark-tomarket accounting requires that the value of a mutual fund’s portfolio
reflect the regular fluctuations in the value of a fund’s underlying
securities, thereby causing the fund’s NAV also to oscillate – or to
float.53
Specifically, mark-to-market accounting requires that a fund’s
advisor value the fund’s portfolio securities using market quotations
when the fund’s NAV is calculated at the close of business each
day.54 To illustrate a simple example, picture a fund whose entire
portfolio consists only of shares in ExxonMobil. At the close of
business, the advisor would multiply the closing value of the
under management of more than $12 trillion in 2009).
45
Worldwide holdings in money market funds reached a peak of $5.8 trillion
in 2009. See Worldwide Mutual Fund Assets and Flow, INVESTMENT COMPANY
INSTITUTE, Oct. 31, 2009.
46
Investment Company Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C. § 80b-2(a)(41).
47
17 C.F.R. § 275.2a-7, 22c-1 (2005).
48
More specificially, money market funds are “open-end management
investment companies registered under the Investment Company Act and regulated
under rule 2a-7 under the Act.” Proposing release at Fed Reg 32688.
49
Cite
50
Investment Company Act, 17 C.F.R. § 270.2a-7 (2008) (Rule 2a-7).
51
Investment Company Act, 17 C.F.R. § 270.22c-1 (2008) (Rule 22c-1).
52
See Proposing Release, supra note __ (describing the rules and
requirements for using the “mark-to-market” accounting method.)
53
See id.
54
See Birdthistle, supra note __ (describing the use of “forward-pricing” in
mutual funds, which results in the calculation of a price only once a day, rather than
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ExxonMobil share price by the number of the fund’s ExxonMobil
shares to determine the value of the fund’s portfolio holdings. For
fund investments that trade on public exchanges, such a computation
is easily and instantaneously made.55
With securities for which no market quotation is readily
available – such as illiquid investments in private companies, foreign
markets, or other rarely traded sectors – the valuation process is
somewhat more complicated. The fund’s board of trustees must
make a good faith determination of the portfolio securities’ fair value,
which it typically does in consultation with a third-party vendor that
specializes in valuing such illiquid investments.56
The goal of the mark-to-market accounting system is to
compute an accurate and timely value of the fund’s portfolio.57 If a
fund fails to update the value of an outdated and illiquid holding, it
will overvalue the total worth of its portfolio. Because advisors are
compensated via fees calculated as a percentage of fund assets under
their management, fund investors will overpay if a fund’s portfolio is
not valued accurately. A classic example of this kind of problem with
fair valuation involves a fund’s investment in a private company – for
whose stock there is no publicly traded price or regular valuation
event – which has lost much of its value but not been updated in the
fund’s overall NAV calculation. Consider, for instance, a start-up
venture whose stock cost $50 per share on January 1. If, one month
later, the company were sued very credibly for patent infringement,
the value of the company’s stock would almost certainly have
dropped well below $50 per share, even if no publicly traded market
reflected that decline. If mutual funds investing in that company did
not then lower the value of their investments, they would in effect be
overcharging their fund shareholders.58 Mark-to-market accounting
attempts to ensure that mutual funds are regularly reporting the most
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accurate valuation of their portfolios, primarily to protect the fees that
fund shareholders pay.59
In addition to holdings that are difficult to value, the
calculation of NAV also must include other, easier computations. A
fund’s cash holdings, for instance, must also be counted, in addition
to liabilities such as administrative expenses, legal fees, and the
investment advisory fee, which must be subtracted. When the grand
total is calculated, it is then divided by the total number of shares
outstanding to calculate a price per each fund share.60
In the first few years of their existence, money market funds
such as the Reserve Primary Fund used this mark-to-market
accounting system and, accordingly, came with a floating NAV.61
2. The Consequences of Redemption
The pricing mechanism of mutual funds is relevant not only
when investors purchase their shares but applies with even greater
force when they choose to sell. Importantly, the fact that mutual fund
NAVs float makes these funds, by definition, immune from that most
devastating problem of financial selling: runs on the bank.62 The
disposition of mutual fund shares is unique in the capital markets
because all mutual fund shareholders – including money market
investors – redeem, rather than trade, their shares. That is to say,
when a shareholder elects to exit a fund, he or she does not sell his
shares on a stock exchange to some other willing investor. Instead,
the shareholder puts the shares back to the mutual fund directly,
which then pays the investor whatever the price of the NAV happens
to be at the close of business that day. This redemption mechanism is
not simply a technical trivium; it has enormous consequences for the
entire governance and operational dynamics of mutual funds.63
By way of contrast, consider that shares in ordinary operating
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companies trade between investors on a secondary stock exchange.
Thus each investor buys or sells corporate shares for whatever price
the market of supply and demand produces. None of these investors
is guaranteed access to their actual monetary investment in the
corporation. Ordinary corporations, unlike mutual funds, thus
experience what is known as “capital lock-in.” 64 After initial
investors commit their investment to the corporation through an
initial public offering or other stock offering, the only ways in which
capital may subsequently flow out of the corporation back to its
investors are through dividends – which are authorized by the board
of directors, not the shareholders – or liquidations upon the
bankruptcy or dissolution of a corporation.65 What a subsequent
buyer of these shares is willing to pay thus turns largely upon what
they believe the future prospects of a corporation are and how those
prospects affect the net present value of shares today.66 These trading
dynamics, when coupled with the ability to sell corporate shares short
and to separate economic and voting rights of shares, contribute to the
creation of a market for corporate control with control premia.67
Redemption at NAV, by contrast, virtually eliminates such
governance mechanisms in mutual funds.
But in both corporations and mutual or money market funds,
the fact that their prices or NAVs float immediately places all
investors on notice that the value of their investment can rise or fall.68
Indeed, each trading day of the year, the value of their investment
will almost certainly rise or fall, either a few basis points or even
multiple percentage points.69 Thus the risk of loss – indeed, even of
total loss – is a real and omnipresent feature of these investments.
3. The Phenomenon of Runs
Because of their floating prices, however, one risk that is not
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present in either corporate or fund investment is that of a run. A run
on a financial institution requires, as a prerequisite, some sort of
promise by that institution of a guaranteed return to its
counterparties.70 A run then occurs when counterparties of the
promising institution fear that the institution no longer holds assets
sufficient to fulfill all its obligations.71 In such a circumstance, the
first parties to divest from the institution are the most likely to receive
their entire deposit, while laggards may receive nothing at all.72 The
dynamics of this situation thus encourage counterparties to rush with
as much haste as possible to withdraw their monies before the
institution runs completely dry.73 In a mutual fund, such a
phenomenon is impossible because the fund never makes the initial
promise to pay out anything more than each share’s pro rata portion
of the fund’s total assets.74
If a fund’s value were to drop by ten percent overnight, for
example, the consequences would be identical whether one investor
redeemed or every investor redeemed. Each investor in the fund
would receive ninety percent of the original value. In an institution
that guaranteed full payment, however, the dynamics would be quite
different. The first ninety percent of investors to withdraw would
receive one hundred percent of their deposits, while the last ten
percent would receive nothing. Not wanting to be one of the latter,
every investor will hurry to be one of the former, exacerbating the
speed of the run.75 When money market funds traded with floating
NAVs, such runs were neither possible nor appeared to be so because
most investors appreciated the fact that they were guaranteed nothing
more than their portion of the fund’s inconstant total. Once money
market funds adopted fixed NAVs, however, most money market
investors believed that their investment was not inconstant but
steadfast. And thus was laid the foundation of the massive run on
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money market funds during the 2008 financial crisis.76
B. Regulation Q & Limits on Interest in Bank Accounts
Bank accounts are perhaps the archetypical example of
financial instruments with fixed obligations. Unlike corporate
securities and fund investments, bank accounts guarantee deposits
with returns certain.77 For investors seeking safety, banks are often
the first option. Of course, most investors would wish that their
deposits at least keep pace with inflation and do not merely remain
static over time. To that end, banks offer savings accounts that
guarantee more than just the safety of deposits.78 Although the
dangers of banks promising more interest than they can deliver are
easy to imagine, the true vulnerability of banks vis-à-vis money
market funds was quite the opposite: their failure to promise enough.
1. Guaranteed Returns, Ratings & Insurance
Banks offer certainty to their depositors through contractual
guarantees to repay, not by abdicating the pricing process to market
performance.79 For so long as a bank remains solvent, the bank is
contractually obliged to make all of its depositors whole. Poor
performance of the market generally or of the bank’s investments
specifically has no legal bearing on the bank’s obligations to its
depositors.80
How does a bank fulfill its promise to honor deposits? Two
options exist. The easiest would be for the bank simply to leave the
depositors’ money intact in a vault and not to touch it in any way. All
funds would then be waiting for depositors whenever they wished to
withdraw them. Of course, such a system is far from how banks
operate. Instead, banks attempt to put their depositors’ funds to work
by lending or investing the money in search of a positive return. To
the extent a bank makes a successful return on those investments –
which can be done through very conservative and comparatively safe
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investments – the bank can both preserve the integrity of its
accountholders’ deposits and make a profit for itself.81 Very often,
banks do earn successful returns. Indeed, with savings accounts,
banks will go further by promising not simply to return one hundred
percent of deposits but to supplement that amount by an additional
rate of interest.
Of course, the greater the magnitude of return a bank promises
its depositors, the riskier its use of the depositors’ funds may
become.82 To generate modest returns, a bank could lend funds only
to lenders with outstanding credit scores, large equity cushions, and
strong collateral guarantees. This sort of lending is precisely what
occurs when a bank “buys” or “invests” in a Treasury bill – the bank
is lending its depositors’ money to the United States government, the
institution with the strongest credit and collateral in the world,
currently.83 Of course, the safer and stronger the borrower, the less
the borrower will pay to borrow money, so the return on Treasury
bills is relatively low. To increase returns, a bank could lend to large
private institutions such as publicly traded corporations, which do not
wield the full faith and credit of a sovereign power but have
historically boasted of excellent creditworthiness.84 Because these
corporations do not have the strength of the United States
government, they must entice lenders by offering higher rates of
interest. For banks seeking a return, the trade-off between risk and
return is clear. As they seek higher interest rates for their depositors,
and higher profits for themselves, they must lend funds to borrowers
with higher risks.85
Assessing the risk of borrowers is thus a primary concern of
the credit markets.86 A bank might perform extensive due diligence
on each potential counterparty to assess its credit risk, but such a
process would be expensive, time-consuming, and duplicative.
Instead, institutions called Nationally Recognized Statistical Rating
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Organizations87 – better known as credit ratings agencies, such as
Standard & Poor’s, Moody’s, and Fitch88 – serve as informational
intermediaries by evaluating the creditworthiness of most major
borrowers in the markets and assigning them grades that are readily
interpreted by borrowers.89 A bank, and indeed any lender, can thus
conform the degree of risk and reward it is willing to pursue by
lending only to institutions with certain credit ratings.90 Extremely
conservative institutions highly concerned with the safety of their
investments, such as banks, may permit loans only to governments or
corporate issuers with the highest ratings.91
Notwithstanding a conservative investment approach with
scrupulous reliance upon independent ratings, a bank’s loan may still
fail of course. If a borrower defaults or goes bankrupt, the bank’s
loan may quickly become worthless. The bank may then have
insufficient assets to honor its contractual guarantees to depositors.
As we have seen, these are the circumstances that could very easily
spark a run on the bank.92
Because of this risk – and hard-learned lessons – bank
accounts are now insured against loss by the Federal Deposit
Insurance Corporation, an independent government agency created by
the Congress to “maintain stability and public confidence in the U.S.
financial system by insuring deposits in banks.”93 The FDIC insures
each depositor up to at least $250,000 per institution.94 Not only does
this facility reimburse significant potential losses, its presence
forestalls runs on banks.95 Because deposits are guaranteed,
individual deposits have no need or incentive to sprint to withdraw
their funds in the event of a bank failure. The FDIC has worked
remarkably well at both preserving deposits and preventing runs.96
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Of course, no insurance comes without a premium, and every penny
paid to insure a bank account comes directly out of the potential
interest returns on that account.
2. The Rise & Demise of Regulation Q
But deposit insurance has not been the only source of friction
to drag the returns of bank accounts lower than comparable
investments without insurance and premia. The most important
historical limitation on the interest rates of bank accounts was a
regulatory restriction: Regulation Q.97 For more than half a century,
from1933 until 1986, Regulation Q imposed a ceiling on the rates that
banks could pay on savings deposits.98
Through the Banking Acts of 1933 and 1935, Congress
enacted Regulation Q to authorize the Federal Reserve to set the
permissible rates of interest that banks would be allowed to pay their
customers.99 These price ceilings had multiple purposes: “to
encourage country banks to lend more in their local communities
rather than hold balances with larger banks in financial centers”100; to
improve liquidity in the banking system; and “to increase bank profits
by limiting the competition for deposits” because “competition for
deposits not only reduced bank profits by raising interest expenses,
but also might cause banks to acquire riskier assets with higher
expected returns in attempts to limit the erosion of their profits.”101
In the 1970s, policymakers wielded Regulation Q to impose
ceiling rates that rested below market rates of interest, a decision with
quick and powerful consequences.102 Throughout the late 1960s and
all of the 1970s, the ceiling rate under Regulation Q never rose above
six percent. During the same period, however, the three-month
Treasury bill offered interest rates almost always significantly higher,
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even spiking above fourteen percent.103 Investors seeking returns
could do far better by investing their money outside rather than inside
bank accounts.104 Predictably, investors eagerly sought out
investment vehicles that were not limited by Regulation Q.105 The
newly introduced Primary Reserve Fund and its ilk were just such
investments.
C. Money Market Funds & Fixed NAVs
As we have seen, money market funds in their earliest
incarnations – like all other mutual funds – featured a floating NAV
that differed markedly from the fixed return of bank accounts.106 But
throughout the 1970s, sponsors of mutual funds petitioned the SEC
for, and received, exemptions to use an alternative to the mark-tomarket accounting technique.107 By using a method known as
amortized-cost accounting,108 money market funds could maintain a
stable NAV that looks much more like a bank deposit, thus
dramatically closing the gap in appearances between the two
instruments. This change occurred just as Regulation Q was keeping
bank interest rates far lower than market interest rates. Thus by
looking like a bank account yet offering far higher yields, money
market funds became tremendously popular.109
1. Amortized-Cost Accounting
In its June 2009 release proposing new regulations for money
market funds, the SEC describes the operation and consequences of
amortized cost method of valuation as follows:
Under the amortized cost method, portfolio securities are
valued at cost plus any amortization of premium or
accumulation of discount (“amortized cost”). The basic
premise underlying money market funds’ use of the amortized
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cost method of valuation is that high-quality, short-term debt
securities held until maturity will eventually return to the
amortized cost value, regardless of any current disparity
between the amortized cost value and market value, and would
not ordinarily be expected to fluctuate significantly in value.110
Therefore, in exchange for promising to invest only in “high-quality,
short-term debt securities,”111 the SEC permitted money market funds
to use this method of accounting. Indeed, after numerous fund
sponsors made identical petitions and promises, the SEC amended
Rule 2a-7 to permit all money market funds to use this method.112 As
a consequence, all money market funds gained the ability to maintain
a stable NAV of $1.00 per share.113 In effect, they now look
extremely similar to bank accounts.
The similarity to bank accounts was heightened by money
market funds’ adoption of several additional bank-like features. First,
money market funds adopted a penny-rounding method of pricing, in
which “the current net asset value per share is rounded to the nearest
one percent” when calculating NAV for the “purposes of distribution,
redemption and repurchase.”114 Once the price of money market
funds was thus stabilized, other features that rely upon predictability
became common, including “check-writing privileges, exchange
privileges, and near-immediate liquidity.”115
Once money market funds began to enjoy success, the
resemblance to bank accounts was made complete by the banks
themselves.116 Seeing their customers flee bank accounts for the
higher returns of money market funds, banks fought back first by
lobbying for the elimination of Regulation Q and then by offering
something they called “money market deposit accounts.”117 The
name was simply a marketing tactic. This kind of bank account had
no “relationship to the money market other than via the name of its
110
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nemesis, the money market mutual fund.”118 Instead, it was simply “a
deposit account product designed to make consumers believe that it
was the same as the money market mutual funds that those consumers
had come to love.”119 But increasing the level of confusion did not
help banks – money market funds continued to grow, and investors
increasingly grew to assume they possessed bank-like security.120
Indeed, with the two similarly named instruments now competing
head-to-head, the money market mutual funds would always win
because they did not carry insurance and thus did not deduct
insurance premia from their returns. Compared to an FDIC-insured
instrument, like money market deposit accounts, they would always
bring greater returns – as well as greater risk.
2. The Growth of Money Market Funds
The fact that money market funds quickly took on the
appearance bank accounts, while offering far higher rates of return –
because they were not restricted by Regulation Q and not insured –
triggered tremendous growth in these investments.121 From before
1971, when they contained no money whatsoever, until their peak in
2008, money market funds accumulated almost $4 trillion in assets
under management.122 During that time, they grew from no funds to
more than one thousand at their peak in 1999.123
Currently, more than 750 money market funds are registered
with the SEC – in aggregate, they hold more than $3.2 trillion, which
represents approximately 39 percent of all assets invested in the entire
mutual fund industry.124 The money market field has also
specialized, and now features prime funds, government funds, and
tax-exempt funds.125 Prime funds typically hold an assortment of
“taxable short-term obligations issued by corporations and banks, as
well as repurchase agreements and asset backed commercial paper
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secured by pools of assets.”126 Government funds “principally hold
obligations of the U.S. Government, including obligations of the U.S.
Treasury and federal agencies and instrumentalities, as well as
repurchase agreements collateralized by Government securities.”127
Investing in the private sector is generally riskier than investing in
government securities, so prime funds usually offer a higher rate of
return, while government funds offer greater safety. Tax-exempt
funds “primarily hold obligations of state and local governments and
their instrumentalities, and pay interest that is generally exempt from
federal income taxes.”128
One major development in recent years concerns the nature of
the shareholders who purchase shares in money market funds.
Initially, money market funds sought investment from individuals;
today, institutional investors – such as corporations, hedge funds,
pension funds, and governmental entities – use money market funds
to “outsource” their cash management operations, and now own
approximately 66 percent of assets in these funds.129
But the impact of money market funds is not confined to the
internal dynamics of funds and their investors. This enormous
investment pool also interacts importantly with the broader money
and credit markets, where these funds use their $3 trillion to buy and
sell short-term investments.130 Those external affairs of money
market funds played a significant role in the financial crisis of
2008.131
D. Breaking the Buck & Financial Crisis
Stresses in the U.S. financial system that had built up
throughout 2008 reached a critical point in mid-September of that
year when Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc. declared bankruptcy.132
The bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers caused the Reserve Primary
Fund first to break its buck and then to experience a run by its
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shareholders.133 The Primary Fund held $63 billion in assets under
management, of which it had invested $785 million – or more than
1.2 percent of its portfolio – in commercial paper issued by Lehman
Brothers.134 When Lehman Brothers went bankrupt, the value of its
commercial plummeted to zero. Thus the Primary Fund instantly lost
$785 million in value, dropping its NAV per share from $1.00 to less
than $0.988.135
Although that loss may not appear substantial, when applied
to large investment holdings, shareholders stood to lose hundreds of
millions of dollars that they had assumed were rock solid. More
importantly, the loss triggered a run on the fund that threatened to
impose far greater losses on the last investors remaining in the
fund.136 When large institutional investors learned that the Primary
Fund was writing down its Lehman holdings to zero, they
immediately attempted to redeem their shares.137 If the Reserve
honored its commitment to these shareholders, it would have had to
pay the departing institutional investors $1.00 for every redeemed
share. For each investor who left the fund with fully intact
redemptions, the $785 million loss would grow into an everincreasing percentage of loss for the stragglers. Just as in a classic
bank run, the first depositors out the door might exit with their entire
holdings until the bank’s reserves are exhausted, at which point
remaining depositors receive nothing.138 To avoid this outcome,
smaller investors in the fund sued to enjoin all redemptions until a
federal court could oversee an orderly liquidation of the entire fund
on a pro-rata basis.139
In addition to these internal dynamics between the money
market fund, its sponsor, and its investors, the failure of the Primary
Fund dramatically illustrated the interdependence of money market
funds and the capital markets. When shareholders in the fund first
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demanded redemptions, the Primary Fund quickly paid out its
available cash to satisfy those requests. Once all of the fund’s cash
was gone, the only way the fund could satisfy additional redemptions
was to sell portfolio holdings. Just as with widespread margin calls
in a bear market, the fund’s rapid sale of its holdings further
depressed the market valuations of those securities. As shareholders
in other money market funds witnessed the collapse of Lehman
Brothers’ commercial paper, the potential bankruptcy of similar
financial borrowers, the run on the Primary Fund, and the downward
pressure on prices by rapid liquidations in the credit markets, they too
sought redemptions and thus precipitated runs on other money market
funds.
Of course, money market funds had suffered losses in their
portfolios previously – the collapse of Lehman Brothers paper was
dramatic but certainly not the first time an investment held by money
market fund had unexpectedly declined in value. Indeed, once –
though only once – previously, a money market fund had broken its
buck. But well over a dozen times previously, losses in a money
market fund’s portfolio had threatened to break the buck.140 In each
of those other cases, however, the investment advisor managing the
fund had itself stepped in to prevent the buck from breaking.141 To do
so, the advisor or one of its affiliates paid full price for whatever
holding in the fund’s portfolio had fallen in value and was threatening
the integrity of the fund’s price.142 Thus, the fund would be made
whole, the advisor would absorb the loss, and the fund shareholders
might never know the difference. Of course, for an advisor to absorb
these losses, it must have sufficient resources to do so. Many fund
advisors are affiliates of major financial institutions, with large pools
of capital at their disposal, and have proven capable of engineering
these internal bailouts. The Reserve, however, is a much smaller
operation. And, in the case of its Lehman Brothers losses, it simply
did not have the financial wherewithal to pump $785 million into the
fund.143

140

See Mamudi, supra note __.
See id.
See Proposing Release, supra note __.
143
See id.
141

142

BREAKING BUCKS

28

[2010

Immediately after the Primary Fund broke its buck, investors
redeemed approximately $300 billion from other prime funds.144
Bracing themselves for runs on their own funds, other advisors of
money market funds retained their cash positions rather than continue
to invest as normal in money market securities.145 The complete
cessation of new investment short-term debt instruments
consequently caused the money market to “seize[] up” and thus
“impair[ed] access to credit in short-term private debt markets.” 146
That is to say, the nation’s large operating companies immediately
lost access to huge sources of loans that they used continually to
manage their daily operations.
To halt the spread of this credit debacle across the broader
economy, the United States government announced massive and
immediate measures. On September 19, 2008, the Treasury and the
Federal Reserve announced a Temporary Guarantee Program for
Money Market Funds, “an unprecedented market intervention by the
federal government in order to stabilize and provide liquidity to the
short-term markets” by insuring each of the country’s money market
funds against losses of up to $50 billion per fund.147
Quiet money market funds no longer bored their investors into
a sound sleep, as the head of the Reserve, Bruce Bent, had previously
suggested.148 Their failures had precipitated a potentially calamitous
failure of the U.S. economy and demanded massive and
unprecedented government intervention.
II. A CRITIQUE OF THE NEW REGULATIONS & RATIONALES
Almost a year and a half after the breaking of the Primary
Fund’s buck and its collateral damage, the SEC has just finalized new
rules that attempt to grapple with these failures of money market
funds.149 While the Federal Reserve and the Treasury Department
wielded both the funds and authority to play more immediate and
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prominent roles in addressing the financial crisis, the SEC’s reaction
to those events is only now becoming clear through its more
deliberate regulatory response. But the SEC’s new revisions to Rule
2a-7 – which tinker with permissible portfolio holdings, continue the
use of discredited ratings agencies, and retain the fixed NAV150 – is a
deeply disappointing response to money market funds specifically and
to the crisis more generally.
The SEC’s new approach conveys a conception of financial
regulation remarkably inconsistent with widely accepted economic
and legal theory. While neoclassical economic theory counsels
regulators to remain detached as to the merit of specific
investments,151 and behavioral theory permits the privileging of
certain, socially optimal investments,152 the SEC has chosen an
altogether different path. The SEC has instead extended a policy of
providing a regulatory subsidy to one specific investment vehicle,
money market funds, at the expense of others. That is, rather than
establishing a neutral ground on which bank deposits, short-term
bond funds, and other investment compete evenly against one
another, the SEC has picked a winner by tilting the field towards
money market funds, which have just demonstrated their weaknesses
and vulnerability.
A. Shorter Maturity & Greater Liquidity
The most serious technical deficiency of the SEC’s new rules
is their mistaken view of the ways in which money market funds
interact with the broader credit markets.153 This misapprehension is
manifest in the SEC’s new requirements that the composition of
portfolios in money market funds consist of investments of shorter
maturity and greater liquidity.154 Generally speaking, investments
with shorter maturity and greater liquidity carry less risk to the
investors who hold them but, as Professor Jeffrey Gordon illuminates,
the SEC’s new rules actually increase risk to the broader financial
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system.155 Inasmuch as investors in even the broken Reserve Fund
lost only a percent or two of their holdings,156 the systemic effects of
the broken buck are arguably far more important.
In its revisions to Rule 2a-7, the SEC has reduced the average
weighted maturity of permissible money market investments from
ninety days to sixty days.157 Similarly, the weighted average life of
these permissible investments is now limited to 120 days.158 The
SEC argues that these shorter time horizons decreases a fund’s
exposure to interest rate risk, decreases the amplification of credit and
interest rate spreads on a fund, and reduces liquidity risk because a
greater percentage of a fund’s investments will mature on a daily or
weekly basis.159
While these arguments are relatively
uncontroversial, they apply only to the internal dynamics of funds.
That is, they are intended to protect money market funds from the
dangers of external investments.
But, as Gordon argues,160 the SEC’s attempt to limit risks
within money market funds “adds systemic risk to financial
intermediation by heightening the pressure on short-term money
markets,” a “flaw” that is “fundamental and requires a rethinking of
the general [money market fund] framework.”161
The premise of the SEC’s tightening of portfolio requirements
in money market funds rests upon the SEC’s earlier decision to
permit fixed NAVs. That is, in order to ensure that funds with fixed
NAVs never experience precipitous or dramatic declines in their
portfolios – a step necessary to ensure that these funds do not
experience runs like the one in 2008 – the SEC has elected to place
substantive constraints on what these funds can invest in.162 And if
short maturities are relatively riskless, the thinking appears to go, then
even shorter maturities must be even more so. But the relatively
minor improvement in the quantum of risk experienced by fund
155
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investors when the maturity is reduced from 90 to 60 days is vastly
outweighed by the comparatively major increase in the systemic risk.
As Gordon notes, “by shortening maturities the SEC proposal [now
rule] will increase rather than reduce the fragility of these markets
because it makes it easier for MMFs to ‘run’ at a time of financial
distress.”163
Gordon’s argument becomes clearer when one considers the
counterparties to money market funds. Money market funds buy
short-term debt – that is, they lend money to the issuers of that debt –
from corporations who need funds to pay for daily operations such as
payroll and trade vendors.164 Any solvent corporation could, of
course, choose not to borrow money for these purposes. A large
enterprise such as General Electric, for example, could simply ensure
that it maintained a cash reserve large enough to cover daily or
weekly expenditures. But in order to do so, General Electric would
need to pay very close attention to its cash flow and, to avoid
miscalculating, would need to include a conservative buffer of more
cash than it ever actually needed.165 Putting resources into carefully
and conservatively managing cash flow necessarily depletes resources
that could be used to expand General Electric’s more profitable
enterprises.166 Perhaps it cannot build a new and efficient plant
because those funds would deplete cash reserves too much, so the
company moves forward with outdated facilities. If, instead, General
Electric could simply borrow at short notice whatever funds it needed
to cover daily outlays, and then repay those loans right away, the
corporation could operate far more leanly and efficiently.167 And,
given the overall size and soundness of its operations, the corporation
could certainly obtain an extremely short-term loan for very low
prices. This process, in essence, drives much of the money market.168
But now imagine that the new SEC’s rules go into effect. If
every money market fund now reduces the maturity of its holdings
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from 90 days to 60 days, borrowers such as General Electric will have
that much less time to repay its loans. Normally, this abbreviated
should not be a problem for a company like General Electric. But at
moments of great stress in the economy – such as we experienced
recently – all corporations may experience cash-flow strains.169 If
those companies now have less, not more time to repay their loans,
the chances of default will necessarily increase.
One or two defaults does not necessarily pose a serious threat.
But as we saw with Lehman Brothers in 2008,170 even a single
default can trigger market-wide problems if large investors react
precipitously. If all money market loans have shorter maturities, then
any defaults will come faster and more quickly – precisely the sort of
cascade that will accelerate and exacerbate widespread panics.
The SEC should be seeking to increase the potential time for
greater reflection and intervention in future moments of financial
stress. But these new maturity requirements do the opposite. In
essence, the SEC appears to have purchased a minor reduction in risk
to the shareholders of money market funds with a major increase in
risk to the entire system.
B. The Continued Use of Credit Ratings Agencies
One of the truly curious decisions of the SEC in response to
all that has occurred in the past two years is its continued
endorsement of the credit ratings agencies.171 In its newest rules, the
SEC continues to limit a money market fund’s investments only to
securities that have been rated – and rated highly – by Nationally
Recognized Statistical Rating Organizations (NRSROs).172 If there is
widespread consensus upon the profound failure of any single
component of the U.S. financial system during the recent crisis, it is
with these ratings agencies that continued to assign their highest
ratings to securitized bundles of ultimately worthless subprime
mortgages. Yet when regulations require the use of such agencies,
these agencies will continue to operate and, assuredly, to continue to
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mislead investors with false assurances as to the safety of
investments. Rather than attempting to swaddle the dangers of
money market investments, the SEC should be doing all it can to
inform investors that the risks of these funds are real and potentially
expensive. No regulation – by the SEC or any other financial
regulator – should continue to rely on these privileged and wayward
NRSROs.
The SEC argues for the continued use of these agencies as a
“screen on credit quality.”173 But the SEC has also been quick to
emphasize that the advisors of money market funds are legally
obliged to “perform an independent credit analysis of every security
purchased.”174
In light of this requirement of an independent credit analysis
by the fund’s sponsor, the continued use of the agencies remains truly
perplexing. As Professor Frank Partnoy and many others have
argued, the credit agencies suffer from serious and irredeemable
capture.175 That is, agencies rate only the securities of issuers who
pay them for that service. Naturally, issuers who seek high ratings
will migrate their business to agencies that offer favorable ratings,
leading to systemic grade inflation.176
These artificially high ratings are worse than useless because,
with the regulatory imprimatur of the SEC, they falsely assure
investors that investments are stronger and safer than they truly are.
Having no such assurance might prompt investors – or their
intermediaries – to conduct their own due diligence or at least to
exercise caution.177 But hearing that a security has a AAA rating may
coax investors into transactions that are, in fact, far more perilous.
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Dissenting SEC Commissioner Kathleen Casey noted that the
SEC’s use of “ratings have long acted as a crutch rather than a
safeguard for many investors, creating a false sense of comfort and
protection and effectively encouraging their use as a substitute for due
diligence – not only on the part of funds and investors, but regulators
as well.”178
As with the foregoing maturity requirements, the SEC’s
reliance upon ratings agencies whose abysmal performance has been
widely condemned increase rather than decrease the likelihood of
future runs on money market funds and consequential failures of the
credit markets.
C. The Retention of a Fixed NAV
A false sense of security is perhaps the single largest problem
with money market funds today. These funds convey an artificial
impression that they are as safe as bank accounts, when recent events
so clearly demonstrate that they are not. This sense of security is
certainly exacerbated by the continued use of ratings agencies, but the
chief culprit in propagating this impression is the fixed NAV because
it so closely resembles the fixed obligations of a bank account. Yet in
its newest rulemaking, the SEC has missed an ideal opportunity to
return to the floating NAV that money market funds originally
used.179
The SEC justifies its continued permission for fixed NAVs by
pointing out that investors enjoy tax and accounting advantages
through this mechanism.180 But even if that claim were true, it would
be so only because of regulatory largesse, not because of any inherent
design innovation. Indeed, it would beg the question of why these
funds, and not all funds, should be allowed to enjoy such preferential
treatment. Or, the related query, why should not all funds –
regardless of their pricing structure – be granted equal tax and
accounting treatment? The SEC is, in effect, granting a regulatory

178

Speech by SEC Commissioner Kathleen Casey, Statement on Money
Market Funds Before the Open Commission Meeting, Jan. 27, 2010, available at
http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/2010.htm.
179
See Final Rule, supra note __.
180
See Proposing Release, supra note __.

BREAKING BUCKS

2010]

35

subsidy to one specific kind of investment over others.
Both the SEC and the fund industry argue that, through
disclosure, fund investors are disabused of the notion that money
market funds are guaranteed.181 Indeed, they claim that all investors
in these funds are acutely aware that their investments are subject to
loss. But nowhere in the SEC’s copious rulemaking materials is any
empirical evidence produced to that effect. When one considers the
history of the growth of these funds, one sees a consistent and
concerted attempt by fund sponsors to make money market funds
appear as similar as possible to bank accounts. For the industry now
to claim that investors never bought their ruse is cheeky at best and
deceptive at worst.
D. The Relevance of the Primary Fund’s Failure
Even if one were to view the rationales and arguments
supporting the SEC’s new rules in the light most favorable to the
SEC, the failure of the Reserve Primary Fund ineffably alters the
calculus for these funds. Whatever investors and the capital markets
may have once thought about money market funds was altered
fundamentally by the events of late 2008. When the U.S. government
stepped in to guarantee these funds against failure, it crystallized the
suspicion that money market funds are, in fact, insured against loss.
But perhaps the only thing worse that operating without insurance is
having insurance for which no one pays. That scenario is always the
prelude to moral hazard and future failures.182
If a financial instrument operates with a fixed return, it must
either arrange a mechanism for guaranteeing that return or be
prepared to suffer runs at the first suspicion that the return may no
longer be fixed.183 But money market funds attempted to have the
best of both worlds: a fixed return without the costs of a guarantee.
In retrospect, the industry argues that it never claimed to offer a fixed
return. Again, proponents argue, disclosure documents clearly state
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that money market funds are not insured and at risk.184 The events of
2008, however, demonstrate that the financial authorities simply
cannot afford to allow this enormous sector of the economy of fail.185
All investors now know that money market funds will not be
allowed to fail. But if these funds continue to operate without paying
insurance to cover their returns, future problems will be more likely
than before. Individual fund sponsors can now make riskier
investments in higher yielding securities, either to capture market
share or to increase profits, all while knowing that if they overreach
and their funds fail, the government is standing by as an insurer. But
a basic premise of all insurance is that those who take the risks must
be the ones to internalize the costs of the insurance. When
individuals do not pay for their own mistakes, moral hazard abounds.
Thus, even if the SEC’s rationales were compelling in a
vacuum, they are no longer so. The SEC must now address the very
real sense of an implicit guarantee that greatly increases the moral
hazard and systemic risk associated with these funds.
III. NEW SOLUTIONS FOR MONEY MARKET FUNDS
The SEC could quickly remediate the perils of moral hazard
and systemic risk in money market funds and credit markets simply
by reducing the level of obfuscation in its current approach. By
adopting the lessons of neoclassical,186 behavioral,187 or prudential
regulation, the agency could quickly encode a new set of rules to
bring greater transparency to this vital and once-ignored sector of the
economy. Two simple but fundamental changes could accomplish a
great deal of this work: either a return to the floating NAV; or the
adoption of an insurance facility to guarantee deposits in money
market funds.
A. Neoclassical Economics & a Floating NAV
Neoclassical law and economics emphasizes the primacy of
market forces in achieving optimal social welfare. As Professors
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Gilson and Kraakman argued in their seminal article, the efficient
capital market hypothesis – and its reliance on a market for
information – “is now the context in which serious discussion of the
regulation of financial markets takes place.”188 Neoclassical theory
promotes a disclosure-based approach to financial regulation, positing
that through a sufficiently competitive market for information,
investors and their agents will quickly and effectively process risk and
price in the capital markets.189 Ostensibly following this theoretical
framework, the SEC itself states publicly that “[o]nly through the
steady flow of timely, comprehensive, and accurate information can
people make sound investment decisions.”190
But the SEC’s approach toward the regulation of money
market funds is fundamentally in conflict with transparency. Indeed,
the SEC’s rules have done much to obscure the true risks associated
with money market funds by abetting the efforts by fund sponsors to
make their funds resemble bank accounts. Were the pricing
mechanism of these funds to revert to their original floating status, all
fund investors would be reminded daily – even without digging into
formal disclosure documents – of the possible losses from their
investments.
1. Transparency
The SEC appears to accept the industry’s contention that
statements in official prospectuses and Statements of Additional
Information effectively convey to all money market fund investors the
claim that their fund investments are perpetually at risk.191 Yet a
great deal of scholarly work has demonstrated the very real
limitations of financial disclosure.192 Few investors read these
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documents; fewer still process the meaning of them.193
These limitations would be true even if the money market
fund industry had not spent a great deal of effort attempting to
override these disclosures. Although all fund sponsors file their
legally required disclaimers, they wink at those statements of risk
through the enormous promotional effort they put into far more
visible intimations of stability in these funds. Money market funds
are regularly referred to as “cash or cash equivalent,”194 they are
furnished with check-writing and ATM privileges, and they are
provided with the all-important fixed price.
Indeed, the success of the industry’s efforts to assure investors
of the stability of money market funds became most clear in the panic
of 2008. Even though the Primary Fund stood to lose then than two
percent of its value, the breaking of its buck represented a profound
violation of trust – investors ran for the exits immediately.195 If they
had believed that their investments were truly at risk, that their assets
might fluctuate a few pennies up or down on any given day, then they
certainly would not have panicked.
But if we assume that only a minority of investors
misunderstood how money market funds operate, should financial
regulations accommodate the foolish or the wise? That is, the
industry might argue that they filed their required disclosure
announcing that money market fund investments are at risk, and that
anyone who failed to believe them is a fool, and that regulating for
bad customers makes bad law. While such an approach might be
reasonable for sophisticated financial sectors, in which counterparties
possess equal bargaining power and information, it makes little sense
for an inherently retail product.196 But what about the presence of
institutional investors in this sector – won’t they protect the interests
of individual investors? While sophisticated players do often
discipline a market to the benefit of all participants, in this scenario,
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retail and institutional investors often invest in separate money
market funds.197 Thus in the absence of regulation that reasonably
accounts for the ability – and inability – of retail investors, problems
will assuredly occur.
Yet proponents of these rules might contend that no change is
needed here. Money market funds have broken the buck only twice
in their history and, both times, investors stood to lose only pennies
on the dollar.198 Such rare and minimal risks, so the argument might
go, simply do not warrant significant changes to an industry. This
argument glosses over two problems: first, without changes, the
frequency of future mishaps is much higher today than before the
2008 meltdown; second, the relatively minor losses to fund
shareholders completely omits the massive and profound losses that
would have accrued in the capital markets, if the federal government
not intervened.
Each of these counterarguments rests on the implicit and
remarkable assumption that the market will perform better if investors
are offered less transparency and furnished with an inaccurate view of
these funds. Yet decades of financial theory and empirical studies
demonstrates the opposite: that with greater transparency comes
healthier, more efficient, and more effective markets.199 If the SEC
emphasized the perils of these funds to investors, many investors may
still choose to invest in them (albeit fully cognizant of the risks),
while others may choose less risky, less rewarding alternatives, such
as bank accounts. Without a regulatory thumb on the scale, the
market could provide a better picture of the price and risk of these
securities, and investors would not live in an artificial cocoon.
2. Equalizing Regulatory Benefits & Burdens
With a simple step, the SEC could level the competitive field
both between money market funds and all other mutual funds and
between money market funds and bank accounts. Simply by reverting
to the regulatory framework that the SEC maintained during the early
years of money market funds – in which they, like all mutual funds,
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were required to use a floating NAV200 – several specific and
systemic foibles of this investment could be policed with robust
market mechanisms.
If the SEC repealed the use of amortized cost accounting –
which it could do with a straightforward amendment of Rule 2a-7201 –
money market funds would then be obliged to use mark-to-market
accounting. Inasmuch as most investment advisors who sponsor
money market funds also oversee large mutual fund complexes, the
industry could quickly adopt this technical alteration. The price of
money market funds would then begin to float and, shortly thereafter,
investors in those funds would see their daily NAVs oscillate between
a few pennies above and below the $1.00 price. This fluctuation
would communicate far more effectively than any prospectus
disclosure the fact that these funds carry the risk of loss and thereby
forestall any future runs on the industry.
If a money market fund experienced the collapse of one its
investments, as the Primary Fund did with its Lehman Brothers
holdings,202 the price of that fund would drop a few pennies lower
than usual, but investors would not be alarmed at the breaking of any
sort of promise. But even if investors did exit the fund, they would
not trigger a run because a floating NAV is, by definition, immune to
such phenomena.
Certain investors, however, may greatly value the stability of
the $1.00 price in money market funds, and a floating NAV would
eliminate this feature. For any investor who demands the
predictability of fixed balance – in order to write checks or simply to
plan future activities – a financial product already exists: the bank
account. Similarly, bank accounts will accommodate those investors
with more conservative investment profiles.
But bank accounts offer lower yields than money market
funds.203 Certainly, that is true – primarily because bank accounts
must pay insurance on their deposits to the FDIC. In essence, money
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market funds have received free insurance, with disastrous results and
equally dire prospects in the absence of revisions. Money market
funds, their investors, and their sponsors have all enjoyed higher
yields by transferring the risk of their investments to the American
taxpayers. Both the equities of that structure, as well as its promotion
of moral hazard, require its termination.
For those money market investors who do prioritize a higher
yield and will not be satisfied with bank accounts, several products
already exist for this taste: short-term bond funds. Short-term bond
funds hold investments extremely similar to those in money market
funds, but are structured as classic mutual funds, and thus already
have floating NAVs. They carry a higher yield than bank accounts,
and reflect more accurate risks for those rewards. In the absence of
the SEC’s regulatory subsidy, money market funds must reflect price
and risk that are true reflections of the prevailing market rate.
The industry argues that investors will move offshore to
riskier and unregulated products.204 But that supposition prompts two
replies: unlikely and so what? Unlike hedge fund investors, about
whom the “offshore” argument is commonly deployed, money market
investors are not seeking outsized returns, privacy, or investment
expertise. These investments are straightforward, plain-vanilla
offerings – bank accounts and short-term bond funds already offer
extremely approximate services in the United States.
Fund sponsors contend that the market has already spoken by
pouring more than $3 trillion into these funds.205 But this argument
ignores the enormous regulatory thumb on the scale – investors have
chosen a product whose price is artificially low because of
governmental intervention. Corn syrup is also highly popular in the
United States but to attribute that fact to superior performance rather
than massive government subsidy is woefully unsophisticated, or
disingenuous.206 Asking customers to purchase bank accounts or
short-term bond funds, as may befit their preference for risk and
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yield, is simply a regulatory-neutral position that defers to market
forces.
The market for short-term paper will be largely unaffected,
inasmuch as bank accounts and short-term bond funds will replace
fixed-rate money market funds as purchasers in accordance with the
migration of investors. Corporate issuers of commercial paper will
not care whether Bank of America’s savings funds or Bank of
America’s money market funds are lending them money. Any
temporary disruption to these channels will be replaced quickly with
buyers already operating within the system. In short, money market
funds have enjoyed thirty years of regulatory largesse, whose
elimination effectively rectifies an old but growing threat.
B. Behavioral Economics & the Selection of Winners
The work of Cass Sunstein and Richard Thaler emphasizes
some of the shortcomings in neoclassical economic theory.207 The
market is deficient in processing information, they argue, because of
biases, distractions, and shortcomings in so many market
participants.208 Rather than leaving all decisions to a completely
unregulated agora, therefore, regulators should be prepared to offer
“libertarian paternalism” in the form of choice architecture.209 That
is, without actually restricting the choices of market participants,
regulators may still privilege certain options over others.
As an excellent example of behavioral theory applied to
financial regulation, consider the Pension Reform Act of 2006.210
Prior to that law, any proceeds employees saved in their retirement
accounts that they did not allocate to a specific investment were
required, by law, to be held as cash.211 In many cases, the
obliviousness or busyness of employees would result in retirement
assets languishing well below levels necessary for healthy savings.212
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The reform act permitted retirement administrators to direct
unallocated investments into conservative, passively managed,
broadly diversified mutual funds instead. In both scenarios,
employees could easily change the allocation of their investments.
The behavioral approach, however, took account of shortcomings in
the laissez-faire approach and simply altered the default setting,
which has resulted in far higher savings rates for plan participants.213
In the context of money market funds, one might argue that
behavioral economy theory might justify the SEC’s behavior even if
neoclassical theory does not. If, for instance, one could argue that the
SEC has surveyed the available options and simply privileged money
market funds for their optimal combination of safety, yield, and
convenience. Indeed, the argument might proceed, requiring a
floating NAV might exacerbate future runs because investors might
panic sooner if they see a fund’s value declining or because the “true”
price of short-term debt becomes highly unreliable during moments of
market stress.
But, again, investors simply cannot trigger a run on any
financial portfolio that promises only to pay them a pro rata portion of
whatever the portfolio holds. Runs occur when investors are
promised more than a pro rata portion, and thus have an incentive to
be the first to withdraw their portions before the corpus is
exhausted.214 More importantly, the SEC has not simply placed an
existing financial option at the top of a menu of choices, it has
through rulemaking affirmatively altered the nature of investment
options by giving one an advantage that could not exist without
regulatory intervention.
C. Prudential Regulation & Mandatory Insurance
Even in financial systems that purport to be capitalist and
laissez-faire, regulation plays a role.215 Indeed, in the United States,
earnest debates about financial oversight do not seriously contemplate
either a truly unregulated system or a truly controlled system – the
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debate is largely one of degree. Prudential, or merit, regulation
therefore always plays a role.216 One of the few truly celebrated
examples of financial merit regulation is the success of the FDIC’s
record of insuring bank accounts. If the SEC declines to require
money market funds to use a floating NAV, then it should adopt some
equivalent system of insurance.
With every financial instrument, some party must be prepared
to absorb the loss of unfortunate market events. A floating NAV
places the risk of that loss on investors in a fund. A fixed NAV
requires that some other party do so. Indeed, a fixed price always
carries an assurance, express or implied, that someone will make
customers whole if investments fail. In the events involving the
Primary Fund, the federal government placed billions of public
dollars at risk to avoid collapse. In bank accounts, the FDIC do so –
but only after being paid to do so by depositors through their banks.
A few variations on this insurance scheme might be equally useful in
the context of money market funds.
1. The Existing, Unspoken Insurance Regime
The first option would be to continue with the current regime.
Currently, money market funds offer the strong suggestion to
investors that their investments are stable, safe, and secure. When
that assurance proved false, as it did in the Reserve Fund, the federal
government guaranteed depositors against loss.217 That is, the
government offered implicit insurance for money market funds
without charging specific insurance premia to any of the participants
– investors, funds, sponsors, lenders – in this system.218
As we have seen, insurance that is given to parties who do not
pay for it simply cultivates serious moral hazard and, if left in place,
provides every incentive for participants to increase the risk of their
activities greatly. Investors have every incentive to put their money
into money market funds offering the very highest yield, while funds
and sponsors have every incentive to choose investments with the
highest degree of risk and reward. If these decisions turn out to be
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poor ones, the loss will be born by all U.S. taxpayers.
Such a system, needless to say, will greatly exacerbate not
mitigate the future likelihood of runs on money market funds and
systemic risk in the capital markets. In light of the equally
problematic rules shortening maturities in money market funds, the
status quo is untenable.
2. Self-Insurance
A second alternative would be to require the sponsors and
advisors of money market funds to insure their funds themselves.219
Such a system has been in place informally for several decades. With
two very notable exceptions, in all previous instances in which fund
have threatened to break their buck, their investment advisors
provided self-insurance to the fund’s investors.220
That is, the advisors or their affiliates intervened to purchase
at full value portfolio securities whose values had declined
precipitously and threatened to break the buck. In essence, the
advisors paid money out of their own pockets to insure the loss and to
make fund investors whole. The advisors paid for this insurance
through the premia of previous profits they had made from managing
the funds.
In many respects, this system most perfectly aligns the
interests and risks of money market funds – if the people most
directly responsible for managing the funds are also the people who
stand to lose the most from mistakes, they will take the optimal
degree of care in running the funds. The limitations, however, are
clearly visible in cases such as the Primary Fund.221 Whenever the
advisor simply does not have sufficient capital to buoy its own fund,
the fund will fail and the system will face collateral risks. Thus a
broader insurance pool is necessary to address the true amount of risk
in these funds.
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3. Collective Insurance
A third option would be to follow the example of the banking
industry of collective insurance.222 Money market funds could either
mutually or governmentally insure their risk across the entire industry
by having all funds pay into a common pool that would rescue any
fund that failed. Of course, all funds would have to pay insurance
premia, the cost of which would in turn be passed through to all
investors in those funds. That additional cost would naturally reduce
the yield for all funds, but only by the true cost of securing these
investments.223
The current system is cheaper, but only because none of the
industry’s constituents is paying for their actual risk. Inasmuch as
different funds operate with different risk profiles, so too could the
premia be risk-adjusted,224 so that the actual costs of investing with a
guaranteed return are internalized with the most accurate allocation
possible. Insurance certainly will not prevent future investment
failures but, as the FDIC has demonstrated, it can protect both
investors individually and the capital markets more systemically.
CONCLUSION
The shattering of the buck in the Reserve Primary Fund
dramatically demonstrated two suspected but unspoken fears about
what were once considered the economy’s safest and surest
investments. Contrary to the industry’s decade-long attempt to
conflate money market funds with bank accounts, the global markets
witnesses precisely how great the risk that funds do carry, not just to
themselves and their investors but also to the broader credit and
capital markets. When the Primary Fund stumbled, investors fled
what they feared were Potemkin bank accounts, and the capital
markets seized.225
Notwithstanding this graphic lesson, the SEC’s regulatory
response has been disappointingly incoherent and ineffective.
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Shunning the principles and guidance of widely accepted legal
economic theories, the SEC adopted instead not just an unlikely set of
risk-reduction measures but an ineffectual one. By shortening the
permissible maturities of money market funds, the SEC has actually
increased the likely velocity and impact of future runs without
making any effort to address the newly heightened peril of moral
hazard.
Neoclassical and behavioral economic theories proffer two
alternative approaches that would eliminate the regulatory subsidy of
these investments and increase the health of the capital markets. By
either replacing fixed NAVs with floating ones or, instead, requiring
the industry to adopt insurance to cover their fixed obligations, the
SEC might have increased the transparency and long-term health of a
cornerstone of the U.S. economy.

